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Instrument rules in monetary policy under 
heterogeneity in currency trade 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 22/2007 
Mikael Bask 




We embed different instrument rules into a New Keynesian model for a small 
open economy that is augmented with technical trading in currency trade to 
examine the prerequisites for monetary policy. Specifically, this paper focuses on 
conditions for a determinate, least-squares learnable rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE). Under an interest rate rule with only contemporaneous 
macroeconomic data, the intensity of technical trading or trend-seeking in 
currency trade does not affect these conditions, except in the case of an extensive 
use of trend-seeking. On the other hand, if the central bank uses only forward-
looking information in its interest rate rule, a determinate and learnable REE is a 
less likely outcome when trend-seeking in currency trade becomes more popular. 
The interest rate rule followed by the central bank in the model incorporates 
interest rate smoothing. 
 
Keywords: determinacy, DSGE model, interest rate rule, least-squares learning, 
technical trading 
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Rahapolitiikan korkosäännöt, talouden tasapaino ja 
heterogeenisuus valuuttamarkkinakaupassa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 22/2007 
Mikael Bask 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten vaihtoehtoiset korkosäännöt vaikuttavat raha-
politiikan toimintaehtoihin pienessä avotaloudessa, jonka valuuttamarkkinakaupan 
toimijoista osa on teknisiä kaupankävijöitä. Työn teoreettiset tarkastelut perustu-
vat sentyyppiseen uuskeynesiläiseen avotalouden makromalliin, jollaisia on suh-
teellisen yleisesti käytetty modernissa rahapolitiikan teoreettisessa analyysissa. 
Työssä tarkastellaan erityisesti ehtoja, joiden vallitessa rationaalisten odotusten 
tasapaino on hyvin määritelty ja opittavissa tilastollisin menetelmin ja joita ta-
loudenpitäjät käyttävät muodostaessaan keskeisten makrotaloudellisten muuttu-
jien ennusteita. Opittavuudella tarkoitetaan tässä yhteydessä tilastollisen mallien 
tuottamien ennusteiden harhattomuutta eli yhtäläistymistä rationaalisten odotusten 
kanssa. Keskuspankki perustaa ohjauskorkoa koskevat päätöksensä joko käytettä-
vissään olevaan tilastoituun makrotaloudelliseen informaatioon tai käyttämäänsä 
ennakoivaan tietoon. Tämän lisäksi se pyrkii välttämään korkotason liiallisia 
vaihteluita, eli se haluaa tasata korkomuutoksia ajan suhteen. Tulosten mukaan 
valuuttamarkkinoiden tekninen kaupankäynti eli trendien etsintä vaikuttaa ratio-
naalisten odotusten tasapainon määräytyneisyyteen ja opittavuuteen vain ääri-
tapauksissa, joissa tekninen kaupankäynti on valuuttamarkkinoita hallitseva, ja 
kun keskuspankin korkosääntö perustuu käytettävissä olevaan tilastoinformaa-
tioon. Ennuste- tai ennakoivaan informaatioon perustuvan korkosäännön tapauk-
sessa teknisen kaupankäynnin yleistyminen valuuttamarkkinoilla sen sijaan vai-
keuttaa talouden asettumista yksikäsitteiseen ja opittavissa olevaan rationaalisten 
odotusten tasapainoon. 
 
Avainsanat: määrittyneisyys, DSGE-malli, korkosääntö, pienimmän neliösumman 
oppiminen, tekninen kaupankäynti 
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In 1993, Taylor (1993) demonstrated that Federal Reserve’s policy could be
described by the following interest rate rule
rt =0 .04 + 1.5(πt − 0.02) + 0.5(yt − y) (1.1)
where rt is Federal Reserve’s operating target for the funds rate, πt is the
inﬂation rate according to the GDP deﬂator, yt is the logarithm of real GDP,
and y is the logarithm of potential real GDP. In particular, the rule in (1.1)
prescribes setting the funds rate in response to the inﬂation rate and the output
gap, where the latter is the diﬀerence between the two measures of GDP. Taylor
(1999) also argues that since the rule in (1.1) describes Federal Reserve’s policy
during a successful period, one should adopt a rule like this in policy-making.
The so-called Taylor rule in (1.1) is an example of an instrument rule since
the funds rate, which is Federal Reserve’s instrument in policy-making, is an
explicit function of the information available to the central bank. The rule in
(1.1) is also named a simple rule since the funds rate is a function of a small
subset of this information (see Svensson, 2003). See Clarida et al (1999) for
a review of interest rate rules in the new Keynesian model, and Zimmermann
(2003) for a more introductory text on the same topic. Woodford’s (2003)
seminal work on rules in policy-making should also be part of the reading list.
Clarida et al (2000) estimate diﬀerent interest rate rules to evaluate Federal
Reserve’s policy during 1960—1996 utilizing a new Keynesian model similar to
the one that we analyze in this paper, and they found that the policy during
the Volcker-Greenspan period was more successful to stabilize the economy
than the policy during the pre-Volcker period. Even though their evaluation
of Federal Reserve’s policy is somewhat simplistic, it is very intriguing.
A determinate and learnable REE?
Typically, in the literature, conditions for uniqueness of the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) are investigated since the policy-maker would
like to avoid coordination problems in the economy. For instance, without
imposing additional restrictions into a rational expectations model, it is not
known in advance which of the REE that agents will coordinate on, if there
will be any coordination at all. To give an example, the eﬀects of changes in
monetary policy may not be known beforehand: is it the case that agents will
coordinate on a REE that has undesirable properties, like a very high inﬂation
rate, or on a REE in which the price level is stable?
Another problem in this context is the actual computations of the
time-paths of economic variables when agents have rational expectations since
one cannot expect that they have perfect knowledge of the economy’s law
of motion. For example, it is a well-known fact among economists that the
transmission mechanism for monetary policy has a complicated structure, and
this also means that there are disagreements about the exact nature of this
mechanism. The following question arises, however: may agents eventually
7learn the REE, if they can make use of data generated by the economy itself
to improve their knowledge of its law of motion?
The concept of learning that we make use of in this paper is least squares
learning, and to have a REE that is least squares learnable, the parameter
values in the perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy have to converge
to the economy’s actual law of motion (ALM), and this happens when the
REE is characterized by expectational stability. See Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) for an introduction to this literature, and Bullard (2006) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) for two reviews of interest rate rules in the new Keynesian
model from a learning perspective.
Heterogeneity in currency trade
Questionnaire surveys made at currency markets around the world reveal that
currency trade to a large extent not only is determined by an economy’s
performance or expected performance. Indeed, a non-negligible fraction is
guided by technical trading, meaning that past exchange rates are assumed to
provide information about future exchange rate movements.
For this reason, we embed diﬀerent instrument rules into Galí and
Monacelli’s (2005) new Keynesian model for a small open economy that
is augmented with technical trading in currency trade to examine the
prerequisites for monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, conditions for a determinate
and least squares learnable REE are in focus, where the following rules are
examined: (i) a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation that includes the output
gap, the CPI inﬂation rate, the exchange rate change, and the interest rate in
the previous time period to have inertia in policy-making; and (ii) a forward
expectations speciﬁcation with the same variables as well as policy-inertia.
See Oberlechner (2004) for an in-depth discussion of two large questionnaire
surveys conducted at the European and the North American markets, Gehrig
and Menkhoﬀ (2006) for a recent survey on trading behavior that includes
references to several other surveys made at currency markets (cf., Cheung and
Chinn, 2001, Lui and Mole, 1998, Menkhoﬀ, 1997, Oberlechner, 2001, and
Taylor and Allen, 1992), and Neely (1997) for a layman’s guide on technical
trading. Note that other terms for technical trading are chartism and technical
analysis.
Relation to the literature
Since the model in this paper nests other models that previously have been
examined, we have a neat relation to this literature. Examples of papers
include Bullard and Mitra (2002)—(2006) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003).
It goes without saying that we replicate the results in their papers since they
f o c u so nc o n d i t i o n sf o rl e a s ts q u a r e sl e a r n a b i l i t yo fau n i q u eR E E ,l i k ew ed o
in this paper, but for a closed economy.
Bullard and Schaling (2006) and Llosa and Tuesta (2006) are papers that
do the same exercise, but for an open economy. The former paper is built
around the two-country model in Clarida et al (2002), whereas the latter paper
uses the same model as in this paper, namely, the Galí and Monacelli (2005)
model. However, there is no technical trading in Llosa and Tuesta (2006) nor
8in the other papers. Lubik and Marzo (2007) should also be mentioned in this
context, even though they neglect from learning issues.
Despite the fact that there are not too many papers that incorporate
technical trading into a theoretical framework, there are a few important
papers that should be mentioned. Frankel and Froot (1986) implement
technical and fundamental analyses into a foreign exchange model, and their
model was among the ﬁrst that utilized this setup when focusing on currency
trade. Other seminal papers include Brock and Hommes (1997), De Long
et al (1990), Kirman (1993), and Zeeman (1974). See Hommes (2006) for
a survey of the literature on heterogeneous agent models in economics and
ﬁnance, and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) for an introduction to exchange
rate determination in a behavioral ﬁnance framework.
Outline of the paper
The theoretical framework is outlined in Section 2, whereas the prerequisites
for monetary policy when an instrument rule is used in policy-making are in
focus in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2A s m a l l o p e n e c o n o m y
A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities is presented in Galí and Monacelli (2005)
for a small open economy, and we outline their model in Section 2.1. In Section
2.2, we present the expectations formations in currency trade that we augment
this model with.
2.1 Baseline model
The baseline model consists of the following four equations: (i) a dynamic
IS-type equation; (ii) a new Keynesian Phillips curve; (iii) a condition for
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP); and (iv) a stochastic process for the



































rrt = ρrrt−1 + εt
(2.1)
where xt is the output gap, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the CPI
inﬂation rate, et is the nominal exchange rate, and rrt is the natural rate of
interest. Moreover, the superscripts e and e,m denote expectations in general
and market expectations in currency trade, respectively, and an asterisk in the
superscript denotes a foreign quantity. See the Appendix for the derivation of
the ﬁrst two equations in (2.1) using equations that are derived in Galí and
Monacelli (2005). The third equation in (2.1) can also be found in Galí and
9Monacelli (2005), and the fourth equation in (2.1) can be found in Woodford
(1999).
Turning the focus to the structural parameters in the baseline model, β>0
is the discount factor that is used when the representative household in the
home country maximizes a discounted sum of instantaneous utilities derived
from consumption and leisure, and δ ∈ [0,1] is the share of consumption in
the home country allocated to imported goods, meaning that δ is an index of
openness of the economy. Moreover, 0 ≤ ρ<1 is the serial correlation in the
stochastic process, and εt ∈ IID(0,σ2
ε).
The other two parameters in the model, α and γ,a r ef u n c t i o n so f
structural parameters in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model. First, α
depends on four parameters: (i) the openness index, δ; (ii) the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption; (iii) the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods in consumption; and (iv) the elasticity of
substitution between foreign goods in consumption. Second, γ depends on α as
well as three other parameters: (i) the discount factor, β; (ii) the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply; and (iii) the share of ﬁr m st h a ts e t
n e wp r i c e si ne a c ht i m ep e r i o d( s e eC a l v o ,1 9 8 3 ) .
Since we examine the properties of the model numerically,1 the exact
relationships between the parameters in the baseline model and the parameters
in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model are not presented. Of course, to fully
grasp the microeconomic foundations in their model, it is necessary to consult
Galí and Monacelli (2005).
2.2 Expectations formations in currency trade
There are two types of trading behavior in the currency market: (i) trend
following in currency trade; and (ii) trading that is based on fundamental
analysis.
When trend following is used in currency trade, it is believed that the
exchange rate will increase (decrease) between time periods t and t +1 ,i fi t
increased (decreased) between time periods t−1 and t. Moreover, to minimize
the number of structural parameters in the model, these two consecutive
increases (decreases) in the exchange rate are believed to be of the same size.
When fundamental analysis is used in currency trade, agents have rational
expectations regarding the next time period’s exchange rate change, meaning





t+1 +( 1− ω)∆e
e,f
t+1 = ω∆et +( 1− ω)∆e
e
t+1 (2.2)
where ω ∈ [0,1] is the degree of trend following in currency trade, and e,c
and e,f denote expectations according to chartism and fundamental analysis,
respectively. Even though the superscript e denotes rational expectations, we
will also think of it as possibly non-rational expectations when we focus on
learning issues in Section 3.3.
1 All MATLAB routines that are used are available on request from the author.
10More sophisticated trading rules, like the moving averages (MA) technique,
would also be desirable to examine in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model.
However, this would complicate the analysis considerably, and it is not certain
that the dynamics is aﬀected that much compared to when simple trend
following is used in technical trading. This conclusion comes from the asset
pricing model in Bask (2006), where it was found that the exchange rate in
time periods t − t0, t0 ≥ 2, had a second-order eﬀect on the current exchange
rate, whereas the exchange rate in the previous time period had a ﬁrst-order
eﬀect. See Bask (2007) for the MA technique in a Dornbusch-style model.
It could be mentioned in this context that since extrapolative expectations
in a general equilibrium model has been rather successful to resolve the equity
premium puzzle (see Choi, 2006), we feel somewhat encouraged to implement
trend following in currency trade in a DSGE model since trend following is a
form of extrapolative expectations.
3 Instrument rules in policy-making
The Taylor rules investigated are presented in Section 3.1, and in Section
3.2, we examine whether there is a determinate REE, given a speciﬁc
parametrization of the Taylor rule and calibrated values of the structural
parameters. Thereafter, in Section 3.3, we look into the possibility that agents
using fundamental analysis, which includes the central bank, may learn the
REE when it is unique.
3.1 Instrument rules investigated
The central bank is using a Taylor rule when setting the interest rate,
and responds to the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate, the exchange rate
change, and the interest rate in the previous time period when making
its policy-decision. Speciﬁcally, two speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule are
investigated; a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the rule
rt = ζrrt−1 + ζxxt + ζππt + ζe∆et (3.1)
and a forward expectations speciﬁcation of the rule







Note that the central bank has rational expectations regarding the variables
i nt h er u l ei n( 3 . 2 ) .
3.2 Determinacy
The complete model under both speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule is summarized
in matrix form in Section 3.2.1, and numerical ﬁndings when it comes to
conditions for a unique REE are presented in Section 3.2.2.
113.2.1 Complete model
Contemporaneous data in the rule
The complete model in matrix form is (see the Appendix for derivations)
Γ · yt = Θ · y
e








γ (δ − 1) 1 δ(βω − 1) 0
00−ω 1












0 ββ δ (ω − 1) 0

















yt =[ xt,πt,∆et,r t]
0 (3.7)
Forward expectations in the rule























0 ββ δ (ω − 1) 0
00 1 − ω 0





To be able to determine whether the complete model has a determinate REE,
a ﬁrst step is to rewrite the model into ﬁrst-order form, and, then, to compare
the number of pre-determined variables in the model with the number of
12eigenvalues of a certain matrix that are outside the unit circle (see Blanchard
and Kahn, 1980).











t ≡ rt−1 (3.11)



















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(3.13)
where Λ4 i st h ef o u r t hc o l u m ni nm a t r i xΛ, because the complete model in
matrix form is now
Γd · yt = Θd · y
e
t+1 + Ξd + Πd · rrt (3.14)
Thus, since there are two variables in (3.10) that are pre-determined, r and
rL, exactly two eigenvalues of the matrix Γ
−1
d · Θd must be outside the unit
circle to have a unique REE.
However, deriving analytical conditions for determinacy is not meaningful
for practical reasons since these expressions would be too large and
cumbersome to interpret. Consequently, we adopt the same strategy as in
other papers within this area and illustrate our ﬁndings for determinacy using
calibrated values of the structural parameters. Speciﬁcally, the following




0.157,β =0 .99,γ =0 .024,δ =0 .2, 0.4,
ρ =0 .35, 0 ≤ ζx ≤ 3, 0 ≤ ζπ ≤ 3. (3.15)
See Woodford (1999)—(2003) for the closed economy parameters α, β, γ and
ρ. Moreover, when the index of openness of the economy is δ =0 .2,t h ei n d e x
is slightly larger than the import/GDP ratio in the US, and when the index of
openness of the economy is δ =0 .4, which is the parameter setting in Galí and
Monacelli (2005), the index corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio in
Canada.
13Contemporaneous data in the rule
See Figures 1a—b for ﬁndings when the central bank is using contemporaneous
data in the Taylor rule. In both ﬁgures, the regions in the parameter
space of (δ,ω,ζr,ζx,ζπ,ζe) for which we have a determinate REE are shown.
Speciﬁcally, since δ, ω, ζr and ζe are given in the ﬁgures, it is the combinations
of ζx and ζπ that are in light areas that give rise to a unique REE.2




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Figure 1a: ω is not too high and ζr + ζe =0 .
2 To minimize the number of ﬁgures in the paper, the regions in the ﬁgures are not only
regions for determinacy, but also regions for least squares learnability of the REE. As will
be clear in Section 3.3, the reason is that when there is a unique REE, agents will also learn
this REE.




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Figure 1b: ω is not too high and ζr + ζe =0 .5.
Figure 1a can also be found in Bullard and Mitra (2002), meaning that we
replicate the ﬁnding in their paper that is for a closed economy. In fact, the
determinacy region in the ﬁgure is not aﬀected by the openness index, δ,a s
long as ζr +ζe =0 . Note that this condition does not preclude inertia, ζr 6=0 ,
nor an exchange rate change reaction, ζe 6=0 , in policy-making. Moreover,
numerical ﬁndings show that these two tools in monetary policy are perfect
substitutes when it comes to aﬀecting the shape of the determinacy region.
In Figure 1b, the relationship between inertia and an exchange rate change
reaction to have a unique REE is ζr + ζe =0 .5. Thus, compared to Figure
1a, the determinacy region is larger in size. One consequence of this is that
the Taylor principle no longer is a necessary condition to have a unique REE,
meaning that the central bank does not have to change the interest rate more
than one-to-one to a change in the inﬂation rate for determinacy. Note again
that the determinacy region in the ﬁgure is not aﬀected by the openness index.
When ζr + ζe ≥ 1,w ea l w a y sh a v eau n i q u eR E En om a t t e rt h ev a l u eo f
the openness index, the degree of inertia and the strength of the exchange rate
change reaction in policy-making. Of course, this ﬁnding does not mean that
the outcome from a welfare perspective is necessarily desirable since it might
be the case that the unique REE is associated with a very high inﬂation rate.
That the degree of trend following in currency trade, ω,c a n n o tb et o oh i g h
to have the determinacy regions shown in Figures 1a—b should be made more
precise. Thus, when the openness index is δ =0 .2,t h em a x i m u ma m o u n to f
15trend following is ω =0 .44,w h e r e a st h es a m eﬁgure has decreased to ω =0 .38
when the openness index is δ =0 .4. Obviously, the maximum amount of trend
following depends on the values of the structural parameters in the model (see
(3.15)).
Forward expectations in the rule
See Figures 2a—e for ﬁndings when the central bank is using forward
expectations of the variables in the Taylor rule.




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when forward expectations in the Taylor rule
Figure 2a: δ =0and ζr =0 .




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when forward expectations in the Taylor rule
Figure 2b: δ =0 .4, ω =0 , ζr =0and ζe =0 .




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when forward expectations in the Taylor rule
Figure 2c: δ =0 .4, ω =0 , ζr =0 .5 and ζe =0 .




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when forward expectations in the Taylor rule
Figure 2d: δ =0 .4, ω =0 , ζr =0and ζe =0 .5.




























Determinacy-learnable region (light area) when forward expectations in the Taylor rule
Figure 2e: δ =0 .4, ω =0 .25, ζr =0and ζe =0 .
18Figure 2a can also be found in Bullard and Mitra (2002), meaning that
we again replicate the ﬁnding in their paper. A diﬀerence between
contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule and forward expectations of the
variables in the rule is that the openness index matters for the shape of the
determinacy region. Speciﬁcally, the determinacy region is smaller in size when
the economy is more open. For example, in Figure 2b, the openness index has
increased to δ =0 .4.
Inertia and an exchange rate change reaction are no longer substitutes in
policy-making when it comes to aﬀecting the shape of the determinacy region.
Speciﬁcally, inertia makes the determinacy region larger in size (see Figure
2c), whereas an exchange rate change reaction makes the determinacy region
smaller in size (see Figure 2d). Moreover, an increased degree of trend following
in currency trade decreases the size of the determinacy region more or less in
the same way as an exchange rate change reaction in policy-making does (see
Figure 2e).
The last ﬁnding should, however, not be taken to an extreme, because when
the degree of trend following is high enough, the determinacy region starts to
increase in size when an even smaller amount of currency trade is determined
by fundamental analysis. Thus, it seems that there is always a unique REE
no matter the degree of trend following in currency trade.
3.3 Least squares learning
When there is a determinate REE, we make use of the minimal state variable
(MSV) solution that is the solution of a linear diﬀerence equation that depends
linearly on a set of variables such that there does not exist a solution that
depends linearly on a smaller set of variables (see McCallum, 1983). Therefore,
in Section 3.3.1, we derive the MSV solution of the model in (3.3), whereas
least squares learnability of the MSV solution is under scrutiny in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 MSV solution
The MSV solution of the model in (3.3), which applies for both speciﬁcations
of the Taylor rule in (3.1)—(3.2), is
yt = b Φ · yt−1 + b Ψ + b Ω · rrt (3.16)
where Φ, Ψ and Ω are coeﬃcient matrices to be determined with the method
of undetermined coeﬃcients. Hence, calculate the mathematically expected
state of the economy in the next time period
y
e
t+1 = b Φ · yt + b Ψ + b Ω · rr
e
t+1 = b Φ · yt + b Ψ + b Ω · ρrrt (3.17)
w h e r et h ef o u r t he q u a t i o ni n( 2 . 1 )i su s e di nt h es e c o n ds t e pi n( 3 . 1 7 ) ,a n dt h e
dating of expectations is time period t. Thereafter, substitute (3.17) into (3.3)
Γ · yt = Θ ·
³
b Φ · yt + b Ψ + b Ω · ρrrt
´
+ Λ · yt−1 + Ξ + Π · rrt (3.18)
19or, if solved for the contemporaneous values of the model’s variables
yt = Γ
−1 · Θ ·
³




−1 · Λ · yt−1 + Γ
−1 · Ξ + Γ




−1 · Θ · b Φ
´−1
· Γ
−1 · Λ · yt−1 +
³
I − Γ















Θ · b Ω · ρ + Π
´
· rrt
Finally, by comparing the parameter values in (3.16) with those in (3.19), we
can solve the following equation system for the MSV solution
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
b Φ =
³
I − Γ−1 · Θ · b Φ
´−1
· Γ−1 · Λ
b Ψ =
³












Θ · b Ω · ρ + Π
´
(3.20)
where (ΦMSV,ΨMSV,ΩMSV) constitute the solution of the equation system.
Of course, the MSV solution depends on the type of Taylor rule that is used
in policy-making since the elements in the matrices are partly diﬀerent for the
two rules.
3.3.2 Learning the MSV solution
Now, is the MSV solution characterized by least squares learnability? To have
a REE that is learnable, the parameter values in the PLM of the economy have
to converge to the parameter values in the economy’s ALM. In fact, the MSV
solution in (3.16) is also the PLM of the economy, which is emphasized by the
“hat”-symbols since Φ, Ψ and Ω are coeﬃcient matrices that are estimated,
and the solution in (3.19) is the economy’s ALM.3
Observe that there is a mapping from the parameter values in the PLM to












⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
³
I − Γ−1 · Θ · b Φ
´−1
· Γ−1 · Λ
³




Θ · b Ψ + Ξ
´
³




Θ · b Ω · ρ + Π
´
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
(3.21)






























3 To be more precise, to have the economy’s ALM, a possibly non-rational forecast of
the next time period’s state of the economy should be substituted into the model in (3.3)
allowing for non-rational expectations. However, since the mathematical expression in (3.19)
would not be aﬀected by this, (3.19) is also the economy’s ALM.
20where τ is artiﬁcial time, and (ΦMSV,ΨMSV,ΩMSV) is the ﬁx point of
the mapping. Then, the MSV solution is expectational stable, or E-stable,
meaning that the solution is characterized by least squares learnability, if the
coeﬃcient matrices b Φ, b Ψ and b Ω are locally asymptotically stable under (3.22).
Speciﬁcally, the MSV solution is E-stable, if all eigenvalues of the following

















DMe Ψ (ΦMSV)=( I − Γ−1 · Θ · ΦMSV)
−1 · Γ−1 · Θ
DMe Ω (ΦMSV)=( I − Γ−1 · Θ · ΦMSV)
−1 · Γ−1 · Θ · ρ
(3.24)
Note the correspondence with Proposition 10.3 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
Be aware that ΦMSV determines ΨMSV and ΩMSV (see the last two
equations in (3.20)). Moreover, since there are multiple solutions of the
equation that determines ΦMSV (see the ﬁrst equation in (3.20)), there are
multiple solutions of the model in (3.3). This means that we have to plug in
each ΦMSV into the coeﬃcient matrices in (3.23)—(3.24), and, in each case,
investigate whether all eigenvalues have real parts less than 1.
However, we will not do this exercise since we are only interested in the
behavior of the economy when there is a unique REE. This simpliﬁes the
analysis considerably since it is shown in McCallum (2007) that for a general
class of linear rational expectations models, a determinate solution is E-stable
w h e nt h ed a t i n go fe x p e c t a t i o n si st i m ep e r i o dt. Thus, the regions in the
ﬁgures in Section 3.2 are not only regions for determinacy, but also regions for
least squares learnability of the unique REE.4
4C o n c l u s i o n s
We have embedded diﬀerent instrument rules into Galí and Monacelli’s (2005)
new Keynesian model for a small open economy that was augmented with
technical trading in currency trade to examine the prerequisites for monetary
policy. Speciﬁcally, conditions for a determinate and least squares learnable
REE were in focus. When a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the rule
is used in policy-making, the degree of trend following in currency trade
does not aﬀect these conditions, except in case of an extensive use of trend
following, whereas a forward expectations speciﬁcation makes it less likely to
have a determinate and learnable REE when the degree of trend following is
increasing. We allowed for interest rate inertia in the analysis.
4 When the dating of expectations is time period t − 1, a determinate solution does not
have to be E-stable. See footnote 18 in McCallum (2007) for an example.
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24Appendix
Derivation of (2.1)
The Galí and Monacelli (2005) model can after extensive derivations be reduced











where πH,t is the domestic inﬂation rate. However, (A.1) is not in an
appropriate form since there are no expected exchange rate terms in the
equations. These terms are necessary when incorporating the expectations
formations in currency trade that are presented in Section 2.2. Fortunately,
it is possible to use the following equations, which are derived in Galí and
Monacelli (2005), to rewrite (A.1) into a suitable form
½
πt = πH,t + δ∆st
st = et + p∗
t − pH,t
(A.2)
where st is the terms of trade, p∗
t is the index of foreign goods prices, and pH,t
is the index of domestic goods prices. Speciﬁcally, shift the ﬁrst equation in

















































· (πt − δ(∆et + π
∗
t)) (A.6)
Thereafter, substitute (A.5) into the ﬁrst equation in (A.1), and the ﬁrst
equation in (2.1) is derived. Finally, substitute (A.5)—(A.6) into the second
equation in (A.1), solve for πt, and the second equation in (2.1) is derived.
Derivation of (3.3)—(3.7)
Firstly, substitute market expectations at the currency market in (2.2) into the























25Secondly, substitute market expectations at the currency market in (2.2) into
the new Keynesian Phillips curve in the second equation in (2.1), and rearrange
terms
γ (δ − 1)xt + πt + δ(βω − 1)∆et (A.8)
= βπ
e










Thirdly, substitute market expectations at the currency market in (2.2) into
t h eU I Pc o n d i t i o ni nt h et h i r de q u a t i o ni n( 2 . 1 ) ,a n dr e a r r a n g et e r m s





Fourthly, rearrange the terms in the Taylor rule in (3.1)
−ζxxt − ζππt − ζe∆et + rt = ζrrt−1 (A.10)























in (3.3), and the derivations are completed.
Derivation of (3.3) and (3.6)—(3.9)







t+1 + ζrrt−1 (A.13)
Thereafter, put (A.7)—(A.9) and (A.13) into matrix form, where the coeﬃcient
matrices Ξ and Π in (3.3) are given by (A.11)—(A.12), respectively, and the
derivations are completed.
Derivation of (3.23)
Making use of Magnus and Neudecker (1999), the diﬀerential of the ﬁrst
element in the mapping in (3.21) with respect to b Φ is
dMe Φ = −
³
I − Γ




































I − Γ−1 · Θ · b Φ
´−1




I − Γ−1 · Θ · b Φ
´−1






















where the derivative at b Φ = ΦMSV is of interest, and the derivation is
completed.
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